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Burden-Shifting Arrangements 
The response of European Union (EU) 
st&fes regarding refugees from the 
foiher Yugoslavia should be consid- 
er& in light of recent developments 
that have led to burden-shifting 
arrangements. These arrangements 
have followed the large increase of 
refugee claims in western Europe 
during the 1980s which resulted in 
overburdened national refugee deter- 
mination procedures. 
EU states have been particularly in- 
terested in improving the control of 
refugee flows before the evolving un- 
ion eliminates internal barriers to free- 
dom of movement.' Since these states 
recognize that the ending of internal 
border controls greatly limits their na- 
tional competence over immigration, 
they have been seeking agreement on 
common criteria to regulate the entry 
of foreigners. 
The main concern is to prevent free- 
dom of movement from increasing il- 
legal activities such as drug trafficking, 
organized crime and terrorism. Irregu- 
lar migrations have also been associ- 
ated to these types of criminal activities 
as a common policy of deterrence is 
being developed. EU states are wor- 
ried that refugee claimants might enter 
by the state with the most relaxed ex- 
ternal border controls and then take 
advantage of the suppression of inter- 
nal border controls in order to seek out 
and settle in the state with the most 
enviable living conditions. The fear is 
that this would in turn encourage ille- 
gal migration and result in an increase 
in abusive claims. 
In order to avoid this situation, a 
coordinated approach is being devel- 
oped. Negotiations have already led to 
the signing of several intergov- 
ernmental agreements2: the Schengen 
Michael Barutciski is a Atle Grahl-Madsen 
Fellow in Law at CRS, York University. 
Michael Barutciski 
~ g r e e m e n t ~  and Schengen 11' on the 
elimination of internal border controls, 
and the Dublin convention5 which es- 
tablishes the state responsible for ex- 
amining an asylum claim. 
The first aspect of this coordinated 
approach is the duty to systematically 
impose visa requirements on the na- 
tionals of most migrant-generating 
countries. This policy is enforced by 
sanctioning carriers which transport 
asylum seekers and others not in pos- 
session of the requisite visa. The sec- 
ond aspect of the approach is to deny 
to those refugees that manage to get 
around the access barrier the ability to 
choose a state of protection. It is gener- 
ally only the state whichissued thevisa 
or in which the refugee claimant first 
arrived that will have to examine and 
deal with the claim. The effect 
strengthens the mechanisms of exter- 
nal deterrence because any member 
state which does not fend off the in- 
flow of refugees finds itself imposed 
with particular d u t i e ~ . ~  
Several other states have indicated 
their willingness to be associated with 
this process. Consequently, a Dublin 
Parallel Accord has been drafted and 
adopted in June 1992 which allows 
non-EU states to join in a mechanism 
that is similar to the one found in the 
Dublin Convention. The EU's objec- 
tives regarding asylum seekers are be- 
coming increasingly clear as states 
such as Poland have signed on.' If 
these new signatory states do not want 
to be considered as potential states of 
first asylum and thereby receive refu- 
gee claimants returned from western 
European states, they must either 
block their borders to potential refu- 
gee claimants or seek similar arrange- 
ments with adjacent states (preferably 
both). The intention is to force these 
"buffer" states to control their borders 
more effectively and prevent the entry 
of asylum seekers who would like to 
make refugee claims in western Euro- 
pean states. 
It is important to note that nowhere 
in any of these instruments is there any 
mention of procedural or substantive 
harmonization of affirmative norms of 
refugee law. No account is taken of the 
critical variations in recognition rates 
for persons with comparable claims6 
Instead, it is assumed that the treat- 
ment refugee claimants obtain in one 
participati'ng state discharges the other 
states from their duties. The overall 
result of this coordinated approach 
greatly reduces the options available 
to refugees? 
Escape From Armed Conflict 
When the crisis in the former Yugosla- 
via began, the western European states 
were about to start negotiations lead- 
ing up to the Maastricht summit in 
December, 1991. Although they were 
not prepared for this new problem, 
they immediately involved them- 
selves by sending diplomatic missions 
to the area. 
When people from Croatia started 
crossing international borders in order 
to seek refuge, some countries adopted 
special measures to allow the admis- 
sion of these refugees. Hungary, Aus- 
tria and Italy were naturally the first 
countries to face refugee flows and 
they responded by accepting several 
thousands of refugees. They were later 
followed bysweden, Switzerland, and 
Germany which admitted tens of thou- 
sands of people fleeing the war zone. 
These countries either dropped the 
visa requirements for ex-Yugoslav 
nationals or provided a form of provi- 
sional admission.1° 
However, other EU members did 
not admit very significant numbers of 
refugees. Furthermore, when the war 
started to spread in early 1992, many 
countries such as Germany tried to 
limit the numbers arriving on their 
territory by stiffening their entry poli- 
cies. This was followed by the adop- 
tion of restrictive measures by 
countries that were geographically 
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even closer to the war zone such as 
Austria and Hungary. Eventually, 
even the former Yugoslav republics of 
Slovenia and Croatia tried to limit the 
number of people fleeing from Bosnia- 
Herzegovina 
Yet as the horrors of what was going 
on in Bosnia-Herzegovina started ap- 
pearing on television sets, most Euro- 
pean countries relaxed their entry 
policies. This attitude was reversed 
once again in the beginning of 1993, as 
EU ministers agreed to stiffen visa re- 
quirements and diminish the possibil- 
ity of massive arrivals of refugees. This 
game of dropping or imposing visa 
requirements continues. It has proven 
to be a somewhat effective way for 
politicians to accept or refuse refugees 
depending on the public mood." 
It should be noted that even though 
European states have not opened their 
borders to refugees from the former 
Yugoslavia, they have not completely 
closed them either. As shown in Table 
1, more than 500,000 refugees have 
sought asylum in the member states. 
Table 1: Number of Refugees from 
the Former Yugoslavia in various 
European States as of Dec. 31,1993. 
State No. of Refugees 
Germany 300,000 
Sweden 50,000 
Austria 74,300 
Italy 32,000 
Turkey 20,000 
Switzerland 14,500 
France 7,000 
United Kingdom 6,600 
Total 504,400 
Source: WorldRqhgeeSurvey1994.p.41. Washing- 
ton: US Committee for Refugees. 
However, this hesitancy and ambigu- 
ous message has had serious con- 
sequences for refugees from Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. Croatia, the most 
important state of first asylum for 
refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
decided in July, 1992 that it could no 
longer count on other European coun- 
tries to provide assistance for the 
refugees it was receiving. Since the 
government d Croatia considered that 
it had reached the maximum number 
of refugees for which it could provide 
asylum, it closed the border and 
stopped admitting refugees from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The desire to contain the refugee 
flow was openly discussed on 29 July 
1992 at the International Meeting on 
Humanitarian Aid to the Victims of the 
Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia. 
Western European states reacted posi- 
tively to the Slovenian proposal of cre- 
ating "safe havens" in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. By having certain re- 
gions that are safe so that people would 
not have to leave in the first place, the 
pressure on asylum countries would 
thus be relieved. 
Right To Remain 
It is generally in this context that a new 
'right to remain' has been mentioned. 
By protecting the right of people to 
remain in safety in their homes, it is 
hoped that refugee flows will be pre- 
vented. The idea is that refugee protec- 
tion will be enhanced if emphasis is 
placed on the basic right of the indi- 
vidual not to be forced into exile. 
The promotion of this new right 
should not come as a surprise. With the 
situation in the former Yugoslavia, 
UNHCR has seen its humanitarian role 
increase significantly. Concurrently, 
western governments have increased 
their financial contributions to 
UNHCR which in turn has naturally 
led the organization to deal with peo- 
ple who have been displaced in a man- 
ner that is conceptually compatible 
with the desires of these governments. 
Likewise, we have seen UNHCR 
increasingly talk about preventive 
protection over the last few years. The 
goal is to eliminate the causes of dis- 
placement and give potential dis- 
placed persons and refugees the option 
of remaining in their homes: 
Preventive protection is activity 
undertaken to attenuate the causes of 
displacement, so that choosing to remain 
home is a humane and viable option . . , 
Though UNHCR intends to develop 
the concept of preventive protection, it 
does not intend to do so at the expense 
of the principles of non-refoulement 
and asylum (emphasis added).12 
Despite these assurances, the devel- 
opment of preventive protection at the 
expense of asylum does accurately 
describe the general tendency in the 
international refugee protection re- 
gime. UNHCR has in fact changed 
from an organization that had a strictly 
palliative role to one that is focusingon 
fixing the problems that cause refugee 
flows. This evolution has become even 
clearer in the former Yugoslavia as 
external asylum protection has largely 
been replaced by internal assistance. 
Indeed, it was not long before power- 
ful European governments made the 
transition from giving refugees the 
possibility of "choosing to remain" to 
becoming the champions of the refu- 
gees' new right to remain. In an exam- 
ple of the manipulation of human 
rights rhetoric, Western governments 
openly expressed their views that eth- 
nic cleansing would be supported if 
refugees were resettled abroad. Refer- 
ring to this position, Frelick writes: 
By analogy, it would be like refusing 
refuge to the victims of the Nazi 
Holocaust by saying that one did not 
want to contribute to Hitler's 'ethnic 
cleansing' of the Jews, all the while 
barring their escape so that rather 
than lose their homes and countries, 
they would lose their lives.13 
This development has to be examined 
since its consequences on people at- 
tempting to find refuge are very seri- 
ous. The promotion of this new right to 
remain presupposes that international 
law does not at present deal satisfacto- 
rily with displacement. It will be noted 
that there is effectively no general and 
explicit prohibition of displacement in 
international law. However, if the in- 
ternational protection system does not 
deal with displacement in a clear and 
comprehensive way, this is because 
the refugee regime purposefully and 
strategically did not seek to focus on 
the prohibition of displacement. Inter- 
national refugee law has been con- 
ceived as having a distinctive 
palliative orientation which comple- 
ments and helps the implementation 
of human rights law. By reserving a 
sphere of autonomy for victims of hu- 
man rights violations, international 
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refugee law allows and empowers 
them to leave the abusive situation. 
The idea is that the international com- 
munity contributes by providing relief 
in the form of temporary asylum. Con- 
ceived in these terms, the role of inter- 
national refugee law is to provide a 
source of interim protection until the 
risks in the state of origin no longer 
exist. This approach does not directly 
attack *placement and the human 
rights p b l e m  surrounding it, since its 
conce-4s rather to give victims a cer- 
tain amount of autonomy by having 
some control over their fates and al- 
lowing them to seek asylum. 
The approach suggested by the 
states that are promoting the right to 
remain constitutes a fundamentally 
different vision of t b  role of interna- 
tional refugee law. The focus is no 
longer on securing a refuge outside the 
state of origin but rather on attacking 
the problem at what is believed to be its 
source. In this sense, the existence of a 
right to remain essentially undermines 
the right of seeking asylum and free- 
dom of movement by having interna- 
tional refugee law collapse into 
international human rights law. This 
evidently poses a problem if one be- 
lieves that refugee law should remain 
conceptually distinct from general hu- 
man law. Indeed, it should be remem- 
bered that refugee law is concerned 
about the protection of a particular 
group of people who have already 
been victims of human rights 
violations. 
Most importantly, the right to re- 
main by itself will not decrease the 
possibility of displacement. What will 
affect the likelihood of a coerced popu- 
lation movement is the relative safety 
of a region. Whether the right to re- 
main can actually help in making a re- 
gion safer or whether it will end up as 
one more unenforceable right depends 
on the international commitment. 
There are however many risks. As the 
case in the former Yugoslavia has 
shown, it is tempting for states to give 
the impression that they are in favour 
of such policies of humanitarian inter- 
vention. Yet when the time comes for 
real action, consensus is found only for 
limited types of intervention which 
prove to be insufficient to actually stop 
displacement. Instead, these interven- 
tions mainly serve to maintain a facade 
of humane concern. In the meantime, 
receiving states can adopt the neces- 
sary measures so that displaced per- 
sons have no choice but to remain in 
their state. 
Indeed, the current practice of many 
states raises concerns regarding the 
future of the right to seek asylum. In 
the context of burden-shiftingarrange- 
ments, there is a real risk that receiving 
states will view migration away from 
human rights violations as inappropri- 
ate and that this vision will be encour- 
aged by the existence of a right to 
remain. In effect, the right to remain 
gives states that want to contain refu- 
gee flows a new argument that is 
phrased in human rights terms and can 
thus be used to cloak restrictive meas- 
ures. Various forms of humanitarian 
intervention can therefore become at- 
tractive methods that self-interested 
states use to avoid international 
obligations. 
The resulting negative use of the 
right to remain could develop into a 
veritable affront to the autonomous 
right to access an interim remedy when 
residence in the state of origin ceases to 
beviable. Far from a right which can be 
exercised freely, the right to remain 
would then contribute in eliminating 
all options.14 
Growing Number of de facto 
Refugees 
The treatment of refugees from the 
former Yugoslavia who have managed 
to access EU territory also illustrates 
the inadequacies of the current inter- 
national legal refugee definition that is 
used by most European states. By de- 
fining refugees exclusively in terms of 
persons who fear persecution based on 
their political or civil status, the 1951 
Convention is not very useful in pro- 
tecting war refugees. 
Even if most EU states have very 
small refugee status acceptance rates 
(generally between 5-15 percent), in 
practice they have been unwilling to 
deport war refugees.15 These refugees 
who do not qualify for Convention sta- 
tus are therefore given permission to 
stay under a designated "B status," "de 
fact0 status," "humanitarian status," 
etc. While this is more desirable than 
deportation, it often leaves these invol- 
untary migrants in a sort of legal limbo 
with minimal or no rights. 
The significance of this develop- 
ment is that there is now in Europe a 
new uncertain category of legal mi- 
grant that is not accorded full rights. 
Without a real legal framework to pro- 
tect these involuntary migrants, their 
status remains ad hoc and subject to the 
whims of domestic politics. In the con- 
text of European populations that are 
increasingly becoming xenophobic, 
this is not a desirable form of interna- 
tional protection for refugees. 
Emerging Norm of Temporary 
Protection 
Thus, the refugees from the former 
Yugoslavia that have been admitted in 
EU states have generally not been le- 
gally recognized as Convention refu- 
gees. According to EU collective policy 
decisions, people fleeing the former 
Yugoslavia are to be accorded a form 
of temporary protection. In effect, 
these refugees obtain an authorization 
for a temporary stay which varies from 
state to state. In some states, refugee 
claims are still accepted even though 
the decisions are not given full effect. 
In other states, the whole treatment 
takes place outside the regular refugee 
status determination procedure. One 
advantage for EU states is that the 
lengthy and costly determination pro- 
cedures are avoided. In cases of mas- 
sive arrivals, this is even more 
important since decisions regarding 
refugee status cannot be made in a rea- 
sonable time limit. 
UNHCR has announced that certain 
minimal conditions must be observed 
during the period when temporary 
protection is provided: admission at 
the border, respect of fundamental 
needs and authorization to stay until 
safe return is possible. If these condi- 
tions are respected, then UNHCR be- 
lieves it is not necessary to allow ben- 
eficiaries of temporary protection to 
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have access to determination proce- 
dures. UNHCR has in effect accepted 
temporary protection as part of its 
mandate while justifying it as a prag- 
matic solution to a complicated pr~blem?~ 
There is a serious problem in that it 
seems EU states are actually quietly 
subtracting themselves from interna- 
tional obligations concerningrefugees. 
This is why UNHCR has insisted that 
the "freeze" on the examination of 
refugee status claims must only be 
temporary. The beneficiaries of tempo- 
rary protection would therefore have 
access to the refugee status determina- 
tion procedure if they are no longer 
accorded temporary protection. In 
practice, however, once temporary 
protection no longer applies, then refu- 
gee status acceptance rates will likely 
be very small. In the meantime, a 
mechanism that allows EU states to 
avoid international obligations while 
preserving a different form of hu- 
manitarian protection will have been 
implemented. 
It should be recognized that this EU 
policy on temporary protection is not 
incompatible with the general objec- 
tives of the burden-shifting arrange- 
ments and the promotion of a right to 
remain--objectives that has preoccu- 
pied powerful states in the Union. The 
general restrictive policies meant to 
prevent the arrival of refugees can con- 
tinue (and serve a complementary 
role) since temporary protection only 
commits EU states if refugees some- 
how do manage to arrive on their 
territories. 
The result is clear. In a context where 
states are giving up part of their sover- 
eignty in order to participate in the in- 
creasing globalization of economic 
activities, the right to exclude aliens is 
jealously guarded. If this is the EU re- 
sponse to a refugee crisis in its own 
back yard, we can only imagine what 
the response will be to situations on 
other continents. Unless there is a re- 
form of the international protection 
regime which attempts to take full ad- 
vantage of what states are in fact pre- 
pared to do, the future for the 
protection of refugees promises to be 
b1eak.m 
The example of former Yugoslavia 
shows that EU states are willing to pro- 
vide a form of temporary protection 
for a limited number of refugees. How- 
ever, the bulk of the assistance takes 
place in the region of origin. Any real- 
istic attempt at changing the direction 
of recent developments in refugee pro- 
tection must fully exploit these open- 
ings. Otherwise, states will deal with 
the problem by themselves and the 
emerging regime will most likely pro- 
vide even less protection for refugees. 
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There has tlkbeer; no imperative to engage 6 
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